**Our interpretation is that the negative gets three conditional world**

**Prefer it—**

**1. Offense**

**a. Neg Flex- key to let the neg shape their strategy- or else everyone would go 3-3**

**b. 2AC strategic thinking- thinking about what arguments to read is critical to developing, real world critical thinking**

**c. Education-breadth outweighs because it incentivizes out of round research**

**2. Defense**

**a. condo forces better 1ac writing, it forces preempts that solve time skew**

**b. dispo or unconditionally forces debates down to core generics with impact - that kills topic education**

**c. condo has diminishing returns every conditional world trades off with case arguments we get to make**

**d. Permutations check- each is conditional world -skews our strat too**

## Trade Advantage

**2nc – EU alt cause**

**The EU alt cause outweighs their internal link and decades of disputes disprove their impact**

**Reuters, 7/26/12** [China's solar companies warn of trade war with EU, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/26/us-china-solar-eu-idUSBRE86P14220120726>]

 (Reuters) - **China's solar firms warned of a trade war** on Thursday, **calling on the Chinese government to strike back** **against** an anti-dumping complaint filed by rivals in **Europe**, but the Europeans said they would not be put off by retaliation threats.¶ Companies led by Germany's SolarWorld ([SWVG.DE](http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/overview?symbol=SWVG.DE)) have asked the European Union to investigate claims that Chinese rivals had been selling their products below market value in Europe.¶ The European Commission, which has declined to comment on the issue, has 45 days to decide if it will start an investigation.¶ SolarWorld confirmed on Thursday the submission by the so-called EU ProSun group, which comprises 25 members in [Germany](http://www.reuters.com/places/germany), Spain, Italy and other EU countries. German solar module maker Sovello is also part of the initiative.¶ A similar initiative was spearheaded by SolarWorld in the United States, leading the world's largest economy to impose in May duties of about 31 percent on solar panel imports from [China](http://www.reuters.com/places/china).¶ "**If the EU were to follow the precedent** of the U.S. and launch an anti-dumping investigation on Chinese solar products, **the Chinese solar industry would suffer a** **fatal blow**," Yingli Solar's ([YGE.N](http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/overview?symbol=YGE.N)) chief strategy officer, Wang Yiyu, said.¶ "**The investigation would** also **trigger a wholescale trade war** between China and the EU, **which would cause huge losses to both parties**," he said at a briefing by leading Chinese solar companies Yingli, SunTech ([STP.N](http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/overview?symbol=STP.N)), Trina ([TSL.N](http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/overview?symbol=TSL.N)) and Canadian Solar ([CSIQ.O](http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/overview?symbol=CSIQ.O)).¶ "We call on the Chinese government to take all necessary and resolute measures to protect the legitimate interests of the Chinese solar industry."¶ **Western solar companies have been at odds with their Chinese counterparts for years**, alleging that they receive lavish credit lines to offer modules at cheaper prices, while European players struggle to refinance.¶ German solar company Q-Cells QCEG.UL became the most prominent victim of an increasingly competitive market, filing for insolvency for April. At least three other German solar companies have filed for insolvency in recent months.¶ EU ProSun, in a visit to meet lawyers handling their case in Brussels, said it would not be deterred by Chinese threats.¶ "A lot of companies who joined our initiative want to stay anonymous because they fear retaliation, but that is not a reason not to act," said Milan Nitzschke, SolarWorld's vice president who is leading the EU ProSun group.¶ "It is a reason to act and defend against those threats," he told Reuters.¶ DIVISION IN EUROPE¶ But not all European solar companies back the complaint and many say Europe should welcome Chinese imports because they make solar power more affordable.¶ Close to 60 percent of China's solar exports, worth $35.8 billion, were shipped to the EU in 2011, the four Chinese companies said. Europe accounted for 74 percent of global solar installations in 2011, according to industry association EPIA.¶ Europeans against SolarWorld's move say the EU ProSun group only represents a fraction of the solar industry.¶ "The majority of the industry would be the losers of an initiative driven by only a few sector representatives," said Till Richter, managing partner at Germany's Richter Solar.¶ "**The backbone of the solar industry**, small and middle-sized local installers, developers, retailers, engineers and maintenance technicians, **would be at stake** **in case of anti-dumping measures being imposed by the EU,**" Richter said in a statement released by the Alliance for Affordable Solar Energy.¶ Nitzschke said EU ProSun did not claim to represent the entire European solar industry, but rather those companies willing to go ahead with a complaint.

#### **EU/China trade disputes now – will only intensify**

Telegraph 9/20/12 “EU and Chinese leaders meet in bid to solve trade row and debt crisis” l/n

Europeans are increasingly concerned over what they call "state capitalism", where a government closely controls privately-owned business, as well as state-owned companies. It can use a range of policies - such as cheap finance and raw materials - to give an unfair competitive advantage to a national company.

The theme has run through a series of flare-ups this year, including China's policy on exporting rare earth metals, trade in aluminium foil and the solar panels dispute.

EU trade commissioner Karel De Gucht said in May that the European Commission - the EU executive, which handles trade for the 27-member bloc - would consider new trade defences for cases in which EU companies feared repercussions in China.

In March, the European Union joined the United States and Japan in challenging China at the WTO over its restrictions on rare-earths, which are used in advanced industries such as electronics and renewable energy.

The restrictions, say EU officials, give Chinese hi-tech companies access to cheaper raw materials.

The Commission is also investigating numerous accusations against China of dumping - where makers sell their products below cost in an effort to gain market share.

Until early September, the dumping accusations mainly concerned low-profile industries, such as aluminium foil, kitchenware and pipe fittings.

But two weeks ago, the Commission launched a probe into suspected dumping of solar panels, after a complaint by manufacturers in Germany, Italy and several other EU countries.

China exported more than $25bn of solar panels to the European Union in 2011.

#### Comparatively larger than the plan

IHT 9/7/12 (International Herald Tribune, “E.U. moves aggressively on Chinese solar panels” l/n)

The E.U. trade case against Chinese solar panels differs from the American case in several ways. The European case is, at least for now, limited to allegations of dumping, not improper government subsidies. But the European case is broader than the U.S. action, which covers solar panels for which either the cell was made in China or cells were assembled into the finished panel in China.

The U.S. Commerce Department in May imposed preliminary anti-dumping tariffs of at least 31 percent on Chinese solar panels, in addition to preliminary anti-subsidy tariffs of 2.9 percent to 4.73 percent that were imposed in March.

The Chinese government has responded by accusing American producers of polysilicon, the main material used in solar panels, of engaging in unfair trade practices and has threatened steep tariffs on the companies.

But Mr. Nitzschke, of EU ProSun, said China would be reluctant to impose steep tariffs on imports of polysilicon from the United States and Europe, which are among the world's largest producers. Ultimately, the brunt of those tariffs would be paid by the Chinese manufacturers that import polysilicon and are already struggling, he said.

Alan Wolff, a trade official in the administrations of three former U.S. presidents and now a prominent trade lawyer, said the Union's anti-dumping case was the world's largest ever, even adjusting for inflation.

Two other trade cases that are not anti-dumping cases may have been larger, depending on how the affected trade is measured and what inflation adjustment is used. Those are a long-running World Trade Organization case involving Airbus and Boeing aircraft, and a so-called ''safeguards'' case in the United States in 1980 against cars from Japan.

But when it comes to anti-dumping cases, nothing matches the case that the Union just filed against Chinese solar companies, said Mr. Wolff, now a senior lawyer in the Washington office of McKenna, Long and Aldridge.

#### 4-5 times as large, in fact

IHT 9/7/12 (International Herald Tribune, “E.U. moves aggressively on Chinese solar panels” l/n)

The European Union began a broad investigation Thursday into whether Chinese companies have exported solar power equipment for less than the cost of making it, in what amounts to history's biggest anti-dumping investigation by value.

The case covers imports from China worth (EURO)21 billion, or $26.5 billion, last year, a hefty 6.5 percent of all E.U. imports of Chinese goods. The European case is four or five times larger by value than a similar investigation under way in the United States, because the Union is the biggest export market for Chinese solar panels.

The European Commission, which is leading the investigation announced Thursday, said the Union accounted for 80 percent of Chinese solar equipment sales worldwide.

**2nc – no escalation**

**Disputes are inevitable, but they don’t escalate**

**Bacchus, 10** [James Bacchus is a former member of Congress and a former chairman of the appellate body of the World Trade Organization. He chairs the global practice of the Greenberg Traurig law firm.Bacchus delivered a version of this piece as testimony to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on June 9, 2010 in Washington, D.C. ¶ Diverting A U.S.-China Trade War, Diverting A U.S.-China Trade War¶ ames Bacchus, 06.28.10, 12:10 AM EDT Disputes are inevitable, but conflict is not, <http://www.forbes.com/2010/06/28/china-united-states-exports-law-wto-markets-economy-trade_2.html>]

Chinese exports are surging. American politicians are complaining. **This is not an easy time for trade relations** **between the U**nited **S**tates **and China**. **The** **Great Recession has created great pressures** **in both countries**. **The temptation** in both **is to** yield to these pressures, and to **retreat** from previous commitments **into** the politically appealing refuge of **protectionism** and economic nationalism.¶ For both the United States and China, this would be a mistake. For both countries, by far the best way forward from recession to a lasting recovery is to sustain and strengthen their mutually beneficial economic relationship. Crucial to this relationship will be a continuing commitment in both countries to more open trade, and a continuing commitment in both countries to compliance with WTO rules for trade.¶ During its first decade of membership, China has increasingly become a leader within the WTO. This is as it should be. As a large trading country, China should, like the United States, help lead the WTO, and China should be expected, like the United States, to have many trade disputes with other WTO Members. Like all other WTO Members, **China is bound by the WTO** **treaty to take all of its** treaty-related **disputes** with other Members **to WTO dispute settlement. In compliance with WTO rules, China is doing so.¶ China has profited enormously from the benefit of WTO trade concessions**, **and from the shelter of the WTO's fundamental rules of nondiscrimination**. **China has a considerable stake in the continued success of the multilateral trading system**. The United States has gained, too, from China's entry into the WTO. Understandably, there is a tendency to focus on where China may have fallen short, so far, in reshaping Chinese ways to a full consistency with WTO obligations. This is especially so during this time of economic distress and continuing economic tension. But a focus on how far China still has to go should not blind us to how far China has already come, and in such a short time.¶ Violations of WTO rules by China should not be excused or overlooked. Nor should any WTO violations by the United States. Such violations are rightly the subject of WTO dispute settlement. But as someone who has negotiated, legislated and adjudicated on international trade, my view remains what it has always been: Every effort should always be made to resolve trade disputes by negotiation before resorting to litigation. This is my strong view with respect to trade relations between the United States and China.¶ Obviously, there is considerable concern in the United States, and elsewhere in the world, with how Chinese currency practices affect the terms of trade. Whatever the prospects for a legal case, this is one issue best resolved by negotiation, and not litigation.¶ Counterfeiting, piracy and intellectual property violations of all kinds remain pervasive in China. The Chinese have a clear WTO obligation to enforce IP rights. Negotiation has accomplished all too little where IP rights are concerned. More--and more ambitious--litigation may be needed.¶ There is understandable concern that China's proposed rules for "indigenous innovation" will discriminate against American goods and services in Chinese government procurement. On this issue the position of the United States is weakened considerably by its own domestic actions. How can the United States criticize China for imposing a requirement to "Buy Chinese" when the U.S. Congress is busy enacting "Buy American" laws?¶ The United States and China should both refrain from discriminatory procurement practices, and should work together to make the WTO's Government Procurement Agreement a truly global agreement. China must comply fully with its national treatment and other WTO obligations in trade in services. A key negotiating aim of the United States should be to encourage China to add to its services obligations.¶ A rapidly emerging area of concern is export restrictions on natural resources. Chinese restrictions on exports have already led to one WTO dispute, on raw materials, and may lead to another, on rare earth elements. No one country can be self-sufficient in everything. The United States and China share an interest in making certain that WTO rules ensure a free flow of trade and investment in natural resources.¶ **Barriers to trade with China are increasingly taking forms other than tariffs**. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical standards and other technical regulations can sometimes be pretexts for protectionism, imposing restrictions on trade beyond those necessary to achieve legitimate domestic purposes. WTO rules provide remedies that can be effective when used against such nontariff barriers to trade.¶ China is increasingly relying on trade remedies to restrict imports. It has every right to do so under WTO rules. China must comply fully with WTO rules when applying safeguards, antidumping duties and countervailing duties to subsidies. So, too, must the United States.¶ Overall, there continues to be a compelling need for China to enhance transparency and to uphold the rule of law. These are trade obligations, and also essential ingredients of any truly enduring economic success for China. ¶ Certainly the United States and China both have much to gain, in their two-way trade and otherwise, from a successful conclusion of the Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Beyond that, new understandings, and perhaps new rules, are needed in such areas as investment and climate change and electronic commerce.¶ The United States and China can work together to address not only their bilateral concerns, but also any number of urgent global concerns. None of our global concerns can be addressed effectively without the engagement and the cooperation of both the United States and China.¶ I worry when I hear other Americans describe China as a "threat" to the United States. Thucydides cautioned us, in his history of the Peloponnesian War, that a belief in the inevitability of conflict can become one of the main causes of conflict.¶ **Trade disputes between the United States and China are inevitable**. **Conflict is not**.

**Specific issues don’t collapse overall commitment to international trade norms**

**Holwill, 08** [\*No Date cited, but most recent internally referenced date is 2008, US China Trade War? Probably Not, Vice President, Public Policy, Alticor Inc

Richard Holwill is the Vice President of Public Policy at Alticor, located in Washington, DC, where he is in charge of worldwide government affairs efforts for Alticor, the parent company of Amway Corporation. He chairs a trade advisory committee for the U.S. Trade Representative..., <https://www.hightable.com/government/insight/us-china-trade-war-probably-not-10897>]

Trade War – **There has been some speculation that** U.S. Government (**USG) actions to sanction China on specific trade issues will prompt a trade war between the** two countries.  Based on conversations at China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), **I believe such fears are unfounded**.  During talks in Beijing, it was clear that working-level MOFCOM **officials fully understand the issues involved** both in the tariffs placed on paper products **and the demand for consultations at the WTO on Intellectual Property Rights** (IPR) **protection**.  **They appear ready and willing to work within the rules-based international trade system to resolve outstanding disputes.**

**2nc – solar tariffs not key**

**Election year politics and souring economy make decline inevitable**

**Rapoza, 12** [1/30/12, Forbes, China-U.S. Trade Relations Could Sour With Economy, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/01/30/china-u-s-trade-relations-could-sour-with-economy/>]

**The U.S.** government **sees China within the framework of a larger labor war**. For years, the job market was never a top concern in Washington. But **with EU again** **on the brink of financial disaster**, according to a recent World Bank report, **and the U.S. job market still lackluster**, **calling out China on trade matters has become a favorite policy initiative for politicians.¶** President Barack **Obama has slapped more trade tariffs on China than** George W. **Bush**, he proudly said in his state of the union address last week. Needless to say, China doesn’t like these tariffs. They don’t bode well for an export-dependent economy that’s already slowing down thanks to its Western trade partners.¶ **Trade tensions can very easily be compounded by the global financial outlook and U.S. election politics.¶** “What I worry about are trade tensions between China and the U.S.,” Stephen Roach, senior research fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs, told China Daily in Davos during the World Economic Forum.¶ Roach called China his “favorite economy” because of its state-run ability to face economic challenges without sacrificing the interest of other economies, or employment.¶ “I don’t think trade friction between China and other economies will grow, but my worry is about (the frictions between) China and the US,” Roach, an expert of the Chinese economy, was quoted saying. “**Trade tensions are going to be a major feature amid the shift in the global environment in the next few years**.”¶ **Chinese companies have faced growing trade protectionism.** **In 2009 it was low cost tires that saw their price competition erode in the U.S. with new trade tariffs**. **Now, the government is working on protecting the U.S. solar panel industry from Chinese competition**. The sector is being investigated under anti-dumping laws.¶ Going after China solar is worse than going after China tires. China’s government has made alternative energy and alternative energy technologies an important part of its five year growth plan. China is the world’s leading producer of solar panels, and competition from China has forced some companies, l[ike Evergreen Solar](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/business/energy-environment/15solar.html?pagewanted=all) in Massachusetts, to stop manufacturing solar panels in the U.S. because they could not compete on price.

**Interdependence prevents trade conflict – other tariffs outweigh**

**Deutsche Welle, 12** [7/9/12, Obama starts fight against Chinese import tariffs, [http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,16082487,00.html](http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0%2C%2C16082487%2C00.html)]

¶ US President Barack **Obama has brought a case to the WTO about China's increased tariffs on US auto imports**. Yet analysts suggest it is about more than merely trade as such. ¶ Incumbent President Barack Obama is battling it out with Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney over Ohio, a swing state. Traveling on a bus through Ohio on the campaign trail, Obama is emphasizing a fight against Chinese protectionism and for US jobs. Ohio happens to be a state that hosts a large part of the US automobile industry.¶ A few states over in Washington, D.C., White House Speaker Jay Carney announced that the Obama administration has brought a complaint against the Chinese government to the World Trade Organization. As Obama disparaged the Chinese tariff as "unfair," US Trade Representative Ron Kirk called upon the government in Beijing to "play by the rules to which it agreed when it joined the WTO."¶ Chinahas raised its import duty on US cars by as much as 21.5 percent, this for 2.5-liter engines. According to Washington, US carmakers exported 92,000 cars to China last year - which amounts to $3 billion in revenue. Chrysler and General Motors are especially suffering under the Chinese tariffs, Carney claims.¶ ¶ Tit for tat, Kirkegaard said¶ For Jacob Kirkegaard of the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, the timing of this attack against Chinese protectionism is anything but coincidental. "**The presidential election dictates the timing**," Kirkegaard told DW. Obama is trying to establish himself as an advocate of the US auto industry, Kirkegaard thinks. With the current headlines he's producing, he wants to "show how much he's championing American industry," Kirkegaard said.¶ Doris Fischer, an economist and professor for China Economics and Business at the University of Würzburg in Germany, thinks this will be seen similarly in Beijing. **China "has already complained about the US turning it into an election topic**," she said. The accusations continue to be the same: China isn't sticking to the rules, China is trying to harm the US economy.¶ State help¶ In hiking up its duties, China insists that the US automobile industry is being illegally subsidized, which is making US cars too cheap. In recent years, the US government has provided funding for domestic auto producers to avoid bankruptcy. Since then, Chrysler and GM are back in the black. China sees a direct connection - and this constitutes a distortion of trade relations, it claims.¶ ¶ All large auto manufacturers maintain production in China¶ Kirkegaard agrees that "support for Chrysler or GM in 2009 was very clearly state help." But that's not the real reason for raising the tariff, he thinks. Kirkegaard assumes that China was seeking revenge for other cases when the US refused to allow cheap Chinese imports. For example, "in 2009, when China wanted to sell tires at dumping prices on the American market."¶ Fischer said the accusations from the US keep coming, "that the Chinese are practicing dumping and that they want to sell goods cheaply in America." But now, the Chinese are standing up to this, saying: "If you look closely, the Americans are doing the same," Fischer said.¶ **Beijing and Washington have been fighting for years over cheap exports, protectionist tariffs or compensatory charges. The cycle of retaliation is never-ending.** Kirkegaard described is an attitude of "as you do to me, I will do to you."¶ Manufacturing pain¶ ¶ Idle threats, Fischer said¶ And now, as champion of the US automobile industry and domestic jobs, Obama has taken his case to the WTO. But are jobs really in danger if 92,000 cars get increased import duties? Fischer doesn't think so. She indicated to DW that GM sold 2.5 million vehicles to China last year, but only "several tens of thousands of those were imported."¶ That's because GM produces its vehicles for the Chinese market in Shanghai, where they are not subject to import tariffs. So any "pain inflicted upon the biggest manufacturers is limited," she said.¶ "It's not something that's going to endanger the general health of any big auto manufacturer," Kirkegaard concurs.¶ Saber rattling¶ Any complaint lodged with the WTO follows the same procedure: Both parties have 60 days time to solve the problem in negotiations. If this brings no results, after a period of consultation, the WTO's trade tribunal becomes active. Such a process can last up to two years.¶ But Fischer doesn't think it will come to this. **She sees the US complaint as "a bit of saber-rattling**." **Kirkegaard also believes that a fight between Beijing and Washington will be quietly resolved - by November at the latest, when the US presidential elections take place.¶ Kirkegaard thinks the US has good arguments for calling foul play upon China. But it's not likely to pursue the case: "There's too much at stake for them both to truly endanger their trade relationship."**

### 2nc china war

**No China war**

**a.) Demographic Reasons**

**Macdonald, 5/11** – US Institute of Peace (11, Bruee W., Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on The Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space Programs, pdf)

In the face of this growing Chinese military space challenge, it is easy to assume the worst about Chinese intentions. China seeks to be able to prevail militarily at some point in the future should conflict come, but they see the United States as militarily superior to them and thus would be unlikely to consciously provoke any military conflict. While we should guard against a worst case, we should not treat it as a given. I do not believe China or the PLA is spoiling for a fight with the United States – China has come too far to want to place their substantial economic achievements at risk unless they faced an extraordinary threat to their national security. In addition, China faces serious demographic realities over the next couple of decades, where their ratio of workers to retirees will shrink substantially (the result of their one- child policy), which further underscores China’s need for stability and continued economic growth for years to come. China also has additional needs, and vulnerabilities:

• Growing environmental problems and water shortages with no obvious solutions that are growing

irritants to the public;

• A relentless search for new sources of manufacturing inputs;

• An increasingly restive working class that is making new demands for higher wages and political

freedoms;

• A non-democratic one-party system that leaves its senior leadership constantly looking over its

shoulder at possible challenges to its authority, especially in the aftermath of the “Arab Spring”;

• Growing citizen anger against corruption and cronyism that seems impossible for the CCP to root

out; and many more.

These factors are reasons why China is probably not looking for war with the United States, though they

also could inadvertently become factors in China’s stumbling into a conflict they would ordinarily not want, through miscalculation or distraction.

c.) 4 more reasons

- Relations/Accepted World Order

- Territorial disputes will not escalate to war

- Economics

- Deterrence

Rosecrance et al 10 (Richard, Political Science Professor @ Cal and Senior Fellow @ Harvard’s Belfer Center and Former Director @ Burkle Center of IR @ UCLA, and Jia Qingguo, PhD Cornell, Professor and Associate Dean of School of International Studies @ Peking University, “Delicately Poised: Are China and the US Heading for Conflict?” Global Asia 4.4, http://www.globalasia.org/l.php?c=e251,)

Will China and the US Go to War? If one accepts the previous analysis, the answer is “no,” or at least not likely. Why? First, despite its revolutionary past, China has gradually accepted the US-led world order and become a status quo power. It has joined most of the important inter-governmental international organizations. It has subscribed to most of the important international laws and regimes. It has not only accepted the current world order, it has become a strong supporter and defender of it. China has repeatedly argued that the authority of the United Nations and international law should be respected in the handling of international security crises. China has become an ardent advocate of multilateralism in managing international problems. And China has repeatedly defended the principle of free trade in the global effort to fight the current economic crisis, despite efforts by some countries, including the US, to resort to protectionism. To be sure, there are some aspects of the US world order that China does not like and wants to reform. However, it wishes to improve that world order rather than to destroy it. Second, China has clearly rejected the option of territorial expansion. It argues that territorial expansion is both immoral and counterproductive: immoral because it is imperialistic and counterproductive because it does not advance one’s interests. China’s behavior shows that instead of trying to expand its territories, it has been trying to settle its border disputes through negotiation. Through persistent efforts, China has concluded quite a number of border agreements in recent years. As a result, most of its land borders are now clearly drawn and marked under agreements with its neighbors. In addition, China is engaging in negotiations to resolve its remaining border disputes and making arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputed islands and territorial waters. Finally, even on the question of Taiwan, which China believes is an indisputable part of its territory, it has adopted a policy of peaceful reunification. A country that handles territorial issues in such a manner is by no means expansionist. Third, China has relied on trade and investment for national welfare and prestige, instead of military conquest. And like the US, Japan and Germany, China has been very successful in this regard. In fact, so successful that it really sees no other option than to continue on this path to prosperity. Finally, after years of reforms, China increasingly finds itself sharing certain basic values with the US, such as a commitment to the free market, rule of law, human rights and democracy. Of course, there are still significant differences in terms of how China understands and practices these values. However, at a conceptual level, Beijing agrees that these are good values that it should strive to realize in practice. A Different World It is also important to note that certain changes in international relations since the end of World War II have made the peaceful rise of a great power more likely. To begin with, the emergence of nuclear weapons has drastically reduced the usefulness of war as a way to settle great power rivalry. By now, all great powers either have nuclear weapons or are under a nuclear umbrella. If the objective of great power rivalry is to enhance one’s interests or prestige, the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons means that these goals can no longer be achieved through military confrontation. Under these circumstances, countries have to find other ways to accommodate each other — something that China and the US have been doing and are likely to continue to do. Also, globalization has made it easier for great powers to increase their national welfare and prestige through international trade and investment rather than territorial expansion. In conducting its foreign relations, the US relied more on trade and investment than territorial expansion during its rise, while Japan and Germany relied almost exclusively on international trade and investment. China, too, has found that its interests are best served by adopting the same approach. Finally, the development of relative pacifism in the industrialized world, and indeed throughout the world since World War II, has discouraged any country from engaging in territorial expansion. There is less and less popular support for using force to address even legitimate concerns on the part of nation states. Against this background, efforts to engage in territorial expansion are likely to rally international resistance and condemnation. Given all this, is the rise of China likely to lead to territorial expansion and war with the US? The answer is no.

### 2nc protectionism

**Protectionism won’t collapse trade**

**Guoqiang 9**—director of foreign economic relations research for China's State Council (Long, “Is Protectionism a Threat to the World Economy?,” 6 March 2009, http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/finance\_investment/2009/03/06/131493.shtml)

I don't think we'll end up with a trade war. Countries mostly adopt protectionist measures within the WTO framework. There are two reasons--the first is that all the countries have something in common in prosting protectionism, second, countries have emphasized corporation at recent top-level meetings. If some country dared to really put up protectionist barriers, it would open up a hornets' nest of criticism against them.

Second, trade retaliation forces parties to weigh the pros and cons before taking protectionist measures. So while protectionism is sure to rise, it would not have a big impact.

Periodic trade disputes will be unavoidable in the near future, but there would be little possibility of trade conflicts. I treat frictional trade rhetoric as a part of the bilateral negotiation process. It just becomes more intense during times of crisis.

**Prefer our claim – We cite government motives**

**Dna 9** (“US does not want protectionism: Clinton,” 19 July 2009, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report\_us-does-not-want-protectionism-clinton\_1275447,)

Allaying fears about the reported anti-outsourcing stance of the Barack Obama administration, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton today said that America does not want a return to protectionism. "What president Obama has said (is) that we do not want a return to protectionism when Congress passed the provision in our stimulus bill," Clinton, who is on a visit to India, told news channel NDTV 24x7 in an interview. The US government has imposed certain restrictions on companies receiving bailout funds from hiring foreign workers. "... So he (Obama) has really tried to speak against protectionism and to make sure our administration does not in any way give credence to it," she said. Regarding outsourcing, Clinton said that it is a concern for many businesses in the US but should not be affecting the trade flow between the two countries. "Outsourcing is a concern for many community and businesses in my country." "So how we handle that is something that we are very focused on doing ... that it does not disrupt the great flow of trade and services that go between our two countries," she asserted.

Even barriers that have put up are small

Rodrik 9, professor of political economy at Harvard University’s John F Kennedy School of Government, is the first recipient of the Social Science Research Council’s Albert O Hirschman Prize, (Dani, “Dani Rodrik: The myth of rising protectionism,” October 13, <http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/dani-rodrikmythrising-protectionism/373102/>)

There was a dog that didn’t bark during the financial crisis: protectionism. Despite much hue and cry about it, governments have, in fact, imposed remarkably few trade barriers on imports. Indeed, the world economy remains as open as it was before the crisis struck.

Protectionism normally thrives in times of economic peril. Confronted by economic decline and rising unemployment, governments are much more likely to pay attention to domestic pressure groups than to upholding their international obligations.

As John Maynard Keynes recognised, trade restrictions can protect or generate employment during economic recessions. But what may be desirable under extreme conditions for a single country can be highly detrimental to the world economy. When everyone raises trade barriers, the volume of trade collapses. No one wins. That is why the disastrous free-for-all in trade policy during the 1930’s greatly aggravated the Great Depression.

Many complain that something similar, if less grand in scope, is taking place today. An outfit called the Global Trade Alert (GTA) has been at the forefront, raising alarm bells about what it calls “a protectionist juggernaut”. The GTA’s latest report identifies no fewer than 192 separate protectionist actions since November 2008, with China as the most common target. This number has been widely quoted in the financial press. Taken at face value, it seems to suggest that governments have all but abandoned their commitments to the World Trade Organization and the multilateral trade regime.

But look more closely at those numbers and you will find much less cause for alarm. Few of those 192 measures are, in fact, more than a nuisance. The most common among them are the indirect (and often unintended) consequences of the bailouts that governments mounted as a consequence of the crisis. The most frequently affected sector is the financial industry.

Moreover, we do not even know whether these numbers are unusually high when compared to pre-crisis trends. The GTA report tells us how many measures have been imposed since November 2008, but says nothing about the analogous numbers prior to that date. In the absence of a benchmark for comparative assessment, we do not really know whether 192 “protectionist” measures is a big or small number.

What about the recent tariffs imposed by the United States on Chinese tires? President Barack Obama’s decision to introduce steep duties (set at 35 per cent in the first year) in response to a US International Trade Commission (USITC) ruling (sought by US labour unions) has been widely criticised as stoking the protectionist fires.

But it is easy to overstate the significance of this case, too. The tariff is fully consistent with a special arrangement negotiated at the time of China’s accession to the WTO, which allows the US to impose temporary protection when its markets are “disrupted” by Chinese exports. The tariffs that Obama imposed were considerably below what the USITC had recommended. And, in any case, the measure affects less than 0.3 per cent of China’s exports to the US.

The reality is that the international trade regime has passed its greatest test since the Great Depression with flying colours. Trade economists who complain about minor instances of protectionism sound like a child whining about a damaged toy in the wake of an earthquake that killed thousands.

Three things explain this remarkable resilience: ideas, politics and institutions.

Economists have been extraordinarily successful in conveying their message to policymakers—even if ordinary people still regard imports with considerable suspicion. Nothing reflects this better than how “protection” and “protectionists” have become terms of derision. After all, governments are generally expected to provide protection to their citizens. But if you say that you favour protection “from imports”, you are painted into a corner with Reed Smoot and Willis C. Hawley, authors of the infamous 1930 US tariff bill.

### 2nc econ

No impact

Barnett 09, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine, columnist for World Politics Review, (Thomas P.M. “The New Rules: The Good News on the Global Financial Downturn,” World Politics Review, 5/25/09 <http://dan92024.blogstream.com/v1/date/200905.html>)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. -- surprisingly led Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape.

None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.

Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends.

And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.

So, to sum up:

•No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?);

•The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places);

•Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered);

•No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy);

•A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and

•No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.)

Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis.

Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis?

Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed.

Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis?

If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism.

At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please!

Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon?

Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

**Economic collapse leads to war**

**a.) History**

**Ferguson 06—**prof of history, Harvard and Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution (Niall, “The Next War of the World,” September/October 2006, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/09/the\_next\_war\_of\_the\_world.html)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

b.) Studies

Miller 2k – economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank (Morris, Winter, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?”)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. **After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries** in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the **conventional wisdom** about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

No risk of an impact – stability and cooperation will only increase

Barnett 09, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine, columnist for World Politics Review, (Thomas P.M. “The New Rules: The Good News on the Global Financial Downturn,” World Politics Review, 5/25/09 <http://dan92024.blogstream.com/v1/date/200905.html>)

When the global financial contagion kicked in last fall, the blogosphere was quick to predict that a sharp uptick in global instability would soon follow. While we're not out of the woods yet, it's interesting to note just how little instability -- and not yet a single war -- has actually resulted from the worst global economic downturn since the Great Depression.

Run a Google search for "global instability" and you'll get 23 million hits. But when it comes to actual conflicts, the world is humming along at a level that reflects the steady decline in wars -- by 60 percent -- that we've seen since the Cold War's end. As George Mason University's Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) notes, that trend applies within the Muslim world, too, so even America's "war on terror" has not quite lived up to the pessimists' expectations.

Wikipedia's page for "ongoing conflicts" cites a whopping seven wars with annual death rates of 1,000-plus. And they're all familiar situations:

Arabs-Israel, Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Sudan and Mexico. None have been helped by the financial crisis, but all predate it. Iraq's internal situation has actually improved, despite slumping oil revenue. And as for fears that Mexico might soon become a "failed state," that government's recent response to the swine flu indicates otherwise.

The CSP's database lists only three new conflicts since 2008 -- Russia-Georgia, Kenya and southern Sudan. None can be blamed on the global economy. Meanwhile, Colombia's internal security has improved dramatically, and Sri Lanka's stubborn separatist movement just collapsed.

Yes, we suffer from Somali piracy, and American and Chinese subs continue their cat-and-mouse games off China's otherwise quiet coast. Still, many expected more from a financial panic that, according to the IMF, erased roughly 6 percent of global GDP: Beijing and Washington locking horns, for instance, instead of letting Taiwan negotiate peace with the mainland.

But disappointment abounds for the doom-and-gloomers:

- Instead of coming apart at the seams, China implemented a stimulus package that seems to be working at home and abroad (see America's construction industry exports). Beijing's flagship companies have exploited the crisis for the extraordinary buying opportunities it has created, locking in long-term commodity and energy contracts in exchange for much-needed cash. Meanwhile its central bank has swapped $100 billion worth of currency with major trade partners.

- Asia's big powers should be at each other's throats over sea-based energy deposits, or at least over North Korea. And yet recently we've witnessed the first China-Japan-South Korea summit, followed soon after by the creation of a $120-billion liquidity fund to help out their smaller neighbors.

- India's Congress Party just won a decisive victory in national elections, allowing it to rule without relying on anti-globalizing elements like its native Communist party. Expect another young Gandhi to champion India's next round of reforms.

- The EU definitely regrets its fast integration of all those now-shaky Eastern European economies. And yet, as Washington Post economic columnist Steve Pearlstein recently noted, ". . . the real story in Europe may be how firmly market liberalization seems to have taken hold. Not only have there been few, if any, calls for renationalizations, but some countries are still moving toward privatization and reregulation. Instances of protectionism are outweighed by the examples of cross-border mergers and acquisitions that have been accepted as a matter of course . . ."

- In the Middle East, the Arab world's biggest state, Egypt, remains committed to opening up its state-heavy economy even more, while Arab sovereign wealth funds continue their aggressive investment in Africa, where China and India's portfolios also grow.- In Latin America, market-friendly forces (e.g., Brazil's Lula) are gaining steam, while market-hostile ones (e.g., Venezuela's Chávez) lose traction.

- Even "axis of diesel" Russia has quieted down considerably over the past nine months, with Vladimir Putin's hand-picked successor, Dmitry Medvedev, slowly emerging as a force of level-headed moderation.

Add it all up and it's clear that assessments such as "the world is in chaos" -- a David Rothkopf beauty -- just don't fly. Periodic riots do not an Armageddon make.

Instead, this crisis has elicited unprecedented cooperation among the world's great powers on both coordinated stimulus spending and making intermarket financial flows more transparent (keep an eye on the IMF). It's also triggered awareness of the need for an additional global reserve currency to help the euro balance the dollar (a convertible renminbi would help).

## Solar Industry Advantage

### 2nc china econ

**No impact to the Chinese economy and the CCP solves econ collapse**

Coonan 08 (10/25, Clifford, IrishTimes.com, “China's stalling boom has globe worried,” http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2008/1025/1224838827729.html)

All of this downbeat news feeds into a growing suspicion that China has had its cake and eaten for way too long, and that there is simply no precedent for a country growing and growing without some kind of respite. Establishing what that pause will look like and what it means to the rest of the world is the latest challenge facing global analysts. A hangover is considered inevitable and the Olympics, while meaningless economically, are widely considered the psychological trigger for China to face a slowdown. Despite all this gloom, however, writing China off is premature. The Beijing government is well placed to help protect the economy from the worst ravages of a global downturn. It has spent the last two years trying to fight inflation and cool the overheating economy, so it's a lot easier for it to take the foot off the brakes than it is to put them on in the first place. The central bank has lowered its benchmark interest rate twice in the past two months, the first time in six years. The State Council is increasing spending on infrastructure, offering tax rebates for exporters and allowing state-controlled prices for agricultural products to rise. Expect significant measures to kick-start the property market to avoid house prices falling too drastically. China has a lot of plus points to help out. Chinese banks did not issue subprime loans as a rule, and the country's €1.43 trillion in hard-currency reserves is a useful war chest to call on in a downturn. The currency is stable and there are high liquidity levels, all of which give China the most flexibility in the world to fend off the impact of the global financial crisis, says JP Morgan economist Frank Gong. China is now a globalised economy, but its domestic market is still massively underexploited, and it is to this market that the government will most likely turn. While it is a globalised economy committed to the WTO, China is also a centralised economy run by the Communist Party, and it has no real political opposition at home to stop it acting however it sees fit to stop sliding growth. Should the economy start to worsen significantly, public anger will increase, but China has been so successful in keeping a tight leash on the internet and the media that it is difficult for opposition to organise itself in a meaningful way. Recent years of surging growth in China have certainly done a lot to keep global economic data looking rosy, but perhaps China's influence has been somewhat oversold. It is not a big enough economy by itself to keep the global economy ticking over, accounting for 5 per cent of the world economy, compared to the United States with a muscular 28 per cent. And whatever about slowing growth, 9 per cent is still an admirable rate, one that European leaders gathered this weekend in Beijing for the Asian-Europe Meeting would give their eye teeth to be able to present to their constituencies.

### 2nc ccp

**China will not disintegrate despite unrest—CCP power and elite unity**

**Pei 09 –** senior associate in the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (Minxin, March 12, “Will the Chinese Communist Party Survive the Crisis?” Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64862/minxin-pei/will-the-chinese-communist-party-survive-the-crisis>)

With no end to the global crisis in sight, many are wondering how long China's economic doldrums will last and what the political impact of stagnation will be. The conventional wisdom is that low growth will erode the party's political legitimacy and fuel social unrest as jobless migrants and college graduates vent their frustrations through riots and protests. Although this forecast is not necessarily wrong, it is incomplete. Strong economic performance has been the single most important source of legitimacy for the CCP, so prolonged economic stagnation carries the danger of disenchanting a growing middle class that was lulled into political apathy by the prosperity of the post-Tiananmen years. And economic policies that favor the rich have already alienated industrial workers and rural peasants, formerly the social base of the party. Even in recent boom years, grass-roots unrest has been high, with close to 90,000 riots, strikes, demonstrations, and collective protests reported annually. Such frustrations will only intensify in hard times. It might seem reasonable to expect that challenges from the disaffected urban middle class, frustrated college graduates, and unemployed migrants will constitute the principal threat to the party's rule. If those groups were in fact to band together in a powerful coalition, then the world's longest-ruling party would indeed be in deep trouble. But that is not going to happen. Such a revolutionary scenario overlooks two critical forces blocking political change in China and similar authoritarian political systems: the regime's capacity for repression and the unity among the elite. Economic crisis and social unrest may make it tougher for the CCP to govern, but they will not loosen the party's hold on power. A glance at countries such as Zimbabwe, North Korea, Cuba, and Burma shows that a relatively unified elite in control of the military and police can cling to power through brutal force, even in the face of abysmal economic failure. Disunity within the ruling elite, on the other hand, weakens the regime's repressive capacity and usually spells the rulers' doom. The CCP has already demonstrated its remarkable ability to contain and suppress chronic social protest and small-scale dissident movements. The regime maintains the People's Armed Police, a well-trained and well-equipped anti-riot force of 250,000. In addition, China's secret police are among the most capable in the world and are augmented by a vast network of informers. And although the Internet may have made control of information more difficult, Chinese censors can still react quickly and thoroughly to end the dissemination of dangerous news. Since the Tiananmen crackdown, the Chinese government has greatly refined its repressive capabilities. Responding to tens of thousands of riots each year has made Chinese law enforcement the most experienced in the world at crowd control and dispersion. Chinese state security services have applied the tactic of "political decapitation" to great effect, quickly arresting protest leaders and leaving their followers disorganized, demoralized, and impotent. If worsening economic conditions lead to a potentially explosive political situation, the party will stick to these tried-and-true practices to ward off any organized movement against the regime. If popular unrest is not a true threat to the party's continued rule, then what is? The answer could likely be disunity among the country's elite. Those who talk of China's "authoritarian resilience" consider elite unity to be one of the CCP's most significant achievements in recent decades, citing as evidence technocratic dominance, a lack of ideological disputes, the creation of standardized procedures for the promotion and retirement of high officials, and the relatively smooth leadership succession from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao.

**No CCP collapse—the government represses instability**

**Pei 09 –** senior associate in the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (Minxin, March 12, “Will the Chinese Communist Party Survive the Crisis?” Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64862/minxin-pei/will-the-chinese-communist-party-survive-the-crisis>)

It might seem reasonable to expect that challenges from the disaffected urban middle class, frustrated college graduates, and unemployed migrants will constitute the principal threat to the party's rule. If those groups were in fact to band together in a powerful coalition, then the world's longest-ruling party would indeed be in deep trouble. But that is not going to happen. Such a revolutionary scenario overlooks two critical forces blocking political change in China and similar authoritarian political systems: the regime's capacity for repression and the unity among the elite. Economic crisis and social unrest may make it tougher for the CCP to govern, but they will not loosen the party's hold on power. A glance at countries such as Zimbabwe, North Korea, Cuba, and Burma shows that a relatively unified elite in control of the military and police can cling to power through brutal force, even in the face of abysmal economic failure. Disunity within the ruling elite, on the other hand, weakens the regime's repressive capacity and usually spells the rulers' doom. The CCP has already demonstrated its remarkable ability to contain and suppress chronic social protest and small-scale dissident movements. The regime maintains the People's Armed Police, a well-trained and well-equipped anti-riot force of 250,000. In addition, China's secret police are among the most capable in the world and are augmented by a vast network of informers. And although the Internet may have made control of information more difficult, Chinese censors can still react quickly and thoroughly to end the dissemination of dangerous news. Since the Tiananmen crackdown, the Chinese government has greatly refined its repressive capabilities. Responding to tens of thousands of riots each year has made Chinese law enforcement the most experienced in the world at crowd control and dispersion. Chinese state security services have applied the tactic of "political decapitation" to great effect, quickly arresting protest leaders and leaving their followers disorganized, demoralized, and impotent. If worsening economic conditions lead to a potentially explosive political situation, the party will stick to these tried-and-true practices to ward off any organized movement against the regime.

**No regime change in China**

**Sautman o5 –** Associate Prof. Social Science @ Hong Kong U. of Science (Barry, Asian Affairs: An American Review, “China’s Strategic Vulnerability to Minority Separatism in Tibet” 32:2, <http://heldref-publications.metapress.com/media/m3tkvmuhmj6hd6l7tpq0/contributions/7/0/w/4/70w4n8148031g102.pdf>)

When a breakup of the Soviet Union first seemed likely, a leading American journalist wrote, “If China ever crumbles, Tibet is likely to be the first piece to break off.”1 Talk of a “China collapse” continues: George Friedman, founder of the U.S. strategic forecasters Stratfor.com, said in 2000 that “China would break up in the next two to three years, not unlike the Soviet Union, but more violently, and would revert to a group of competing local warlords.” 2 Political scientist Ross Terrill writes of a “climactic moment still to come, when a Chinese Boris Yeltsin shouts a few truths and the machinery falls apart.”3 Few predictions by scholars have focused on ethnic minority separatism as a major cause of a breakup, however, and a bestselling book on China’s “coming collapse” devotes only a few anecdotal pages to Tibet.4 Yet the idea of China as vulnerable through Tibet has a purchase on the popular Western imagination, because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) system is thought to be inherently self-destructive, while spiritually based Tibetan separatism is seen as inherently virtuous. This paper examines China’s levels of vulnerability to separatism in Tibet. It argues that most pronouncements on the question have focused on efforts to mobilize support for separation as opposed to how events are likely to unfold. Separatism in Tibet is unlikely to contribute to regime change in China, which would not in any case result in a “free” Tibet,5 nor is it apt to foster disintegration. As Yang Dali and Wei Houkai observe, “China will disintegrate only if the central government itself falls apart”6; that is, becomes so weak it cannot prevent local elites from detaching both minority and key Han Chinese areas. That scenario is unlikely: even China’s warlords, during and after World War I, wanted their regions to remain part of the country and proclaimed provinces independent only for negotiating purposes**.**7 Disintegration might occur if China lost a major war, had a sustained depression, or was wracked by violent factional struggle leading to massive elite disaffection, popular mobilization, and the conviction that no acceptable central regime can be formed.Absent sustained organizing by a national political force, however, the current combination of gross inequality, mismanagement, and corruption is unlikely to lead to a national breakup or even to regime change in China. Many countries subsist with worse problems, and many survive despite being weaker states than China.Moreover, protests in China are localized and not directed against national elites, who are instead often cast as potential allies against lower-level officials and bosses.8 The already low-order vulnerability to separatism in Tibet will probably diminish further, due mainly to separatism’s identification with the Dalai Lama, whose political vitality will likely ebb as he ages. This paper points out measures Beijing might adopt to reduce vulnerability to a “nuisance, not a threat,” while benefiting Tibetans and building the confidence needed to bring about negotiations with the Tibetan émigrés.